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TRUSTS-IMPROVED REAL ESTATE-VALIDITY OF DEPRECIATION 
R.EsERVEs-Depreciation of physical assets is an accounting proce-
dure now taken for granted in the business and tax areas of the 
law. Its emergence in ~he field of trusts has been relatively slow, 
however, and even today it has not gained much acceptance by the 
courts. It is the purpose of this comment to examine some of the 
reasons why the courts have been reluctant in applying the depre-
ciation concept to trusts, and in particular to those trusts that in-
clude improved real estate among the assets of the corpus. 
The United States Supreme Court has defined depreciation as 
follows: "Broadly speaking, depreciation is the loss, not restored 
by current maintenance, which is due to all the factors causing the 
ultimate retirement of the property. These factors embrace wear 
and tear, decay, inadequacy and obsolescence."1 Looked at from 
another viewpoint, depreciation is an allocation of the cost of a 
building among the periods of time during which the asset is of 
benefit. It is· a charge against the income that the building has 
produced.2 For a proper perspective of the development of the 
depreciation concept as applied to those trusts that include im-
proved realty among the assets, it is advantageous to examine first 
the law regarding a bequest of property consisting of wasting or 
consumable assets to a life tenant and remainderman. 
1 Lindheimer v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 292 U.S. 151 at 167 (1933). 
2 4 FLA. L. REv. 41 at 42 (1951). 
858 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55 
The Doctrine of Howe v. Dartmouth 
The early English case of Howe v. Dartmouth3 established 
the rule that where property of a wasting or consumable nature4 
is devised generally or under a residuary clause to one for life with 
a remainder over, the court will presume, in the absence of langu-
age in the will to the contrary, that the testator intended both 
the life tenant and remainderman to enjoy the property. Conse-
quently, the court will not allow the life tenant to deplete the 
wasting assets to the detriment of the remainderman and will order 
a sale of the wasting assets and a conversion of the proceeds into 
securities, with the life tenant receiving only the income there-
from.6 
The same rule is applicable to trusts which include wasting or 
consumable property among the trust assets. Under these condi-
tions the courts hold that the trustee is under a duty either (1) to 
set up an amortization fund out of income received from the wast-
ing property, or (2). to sell the property and reinvest the proceeds 
in proper trust investments with the life tenant receiving only the 
income.6 Of course, if the trust instrument specifies that the wast-
ing property is to be retained, the intention of the settlor will be 
followed. It is to be noted that some courts are reluctant to apply 
the general rule and avoid its application by declaring that it 
would defeat the true intention of the settlor or testator. 7 
The rationale behind the rule of Howe v. Dartmouth seems 
both logical and fair. Payment to the life tenant in specie or in-
come from wasting property could result in virtual depletion of 
the property by the time that the remainderman's interest vested 
in possession. The value of such property would decrease annually 
as depletion occurred, perhaps even in the face of rapidly increas-
ing land values. Thus by a reconversion of the wasting property 
87 Ves. 137, 32 Eng. Rep. 56 (1802). . 
4 Wasting or consumable property includes leasehold interests, royalties, patent rights, 
mines, oil and gas wells, quarries and timberlands. 3 Scorr, TRUSTS, 2d ed., §239, p. 1857 
(1956). 
5 While acknowledging the general rule, some American courts have been sympathetic 
to the claims of life beneficiaries that the application of the rule would defeat the true 
intention of the testator. Hence some courts do not apply the general rule if there are 
even slight indications that the testator intended otherwise, particularly if the life beneficiary 
was dependent upon the testator or was one of the chief objects of his bounty. TRUSTS 
REsrATEMENT, §239, comment e (1935); Capron, "Reserves Against the Depreciation of Real 
Property Held by a Trustee," 12 Omo ST. L.J. 565 at 568 (1951). See generally 77 A.L.R. 
753 (1932). 
6 3 Scorr, TRUSTS, 2d ed., §239, p. 1857 (1956). 
7 Note 5 supra. 
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into trust securities or by setting up an amortization fund out of 
income, the trust res would be more likely to remain relatively in-
tact in value, and the ultimate result would be a more nearly 
normal distribution between the life beneficiary and the remain-
derman. 
The Rule of Howe v. Dartmouth and Trusts With Improved 
Realty 
Theoretically, at least, one could argue that the rule of Howe 
v. Dartmouth should apply to trusts having improved real estate 
among the corpus assets. Generally the courts have not treated 
buildings as a wasting asset.8 It is apparent, however, that as the 
years pass, buildings are subject to loss in value due to wear and 
tear, deterioration, obsolescence and inadequacy. Hence, unless 
the settlor has indicated that no charges are to be placed against 
the income allocable to the life beneficiary, it can be argued that 
the settlor would want the corpus buildings to be kept relatively 
intact in monetary value as well as physical condition. As one 
writer has suggested, it is a problem of defining what the settlor 
meant by the principal. Did he intend the principal to consist of 
buildings for as long a. period as they would last, or did he con-
ceive of the principal as a fund represented by the value of the 
property?9 If the latter were the testator's intent, the allocation of 
a portion of the income for depreciation would appear to be 
proper. However, most courts that have passed on this question 
have ignored this distinction and have refused to allow deprecia-
tion charges to be deducted from income allocable to the life 
beneficiary unless the trust instrument so authorizes.10 Basically, 
of course, it is a question of a conflict between the interest of the 
life beneficiary in receiving the full income from the corpus and 
the interest in the remainderman in preserving the corpus. The 
New York courts, wherein the great majority of cases passing on 
this question have been litigated, have resolved this question in 
favor of the life beneficiary, and have held that the trustee has no 
duty to the remainderman to set aside out of income a reserve for 
depreciation, and indeed may not properly do so unless there is an 
8 60 HARv. L. REv. 952 (1947); 52 CoL. L. REv. 808 (1952). 
9 Isaacs, "Principal-Quantum or Res?" 46 HARv. L. REv. 776 (1933). 
10 3 Scorr, TRUSTS, 2d ed., §239.4, p. 1871 (1956); 60 HARv. L. REv. 952 (1947); Capron, 
"Reserves Against the Depreciation of Real Property Held by a Trustee,'' 12 Omo ST. 
L.J. 565 at 572 and 576 (1951); 48 MICH. L. REv. 542 (1950). 
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authorization for such a reserve in the trust instrument.11 Most 
of the courts of other states that have passed on the question follow 
the New York rule and refuse to permit the trustee to set up a 
depreciation reserve.12 
There are probably several basic reasons why the general rule 
against the allowing of depreciation reserves on buildings held in 
trusts came into being. One reason could be the relative novelty 
of the depreciation concept as compared with the much older 
rules of trust administration. Another might be the analogy to 
legal interests consisting of a life estate and remainder, in which 
the life tenant has only the duty of ordinary repairs coupled with 
a prohibition against the committing of waste. Other courts have 
stated that taking an allowance for depreciation out of income 
defeats the primary intention of the testator to benefit the life 
tenant in that usually the life tenant is the chief object of the 
testator's bounty. Another argument made is that the remainder-
man stands to benefit from any increase in the value of the corpus 
and thus should absorb the loss caused by depreciation. Further-
more, because of the general rise in prices and valuations of prop-
erty, the possible harm to the remainderman caused by a lack of 
depreciation reserves has been somewhat a,lleviated. 
Another aspect of the problem that should be borne in mind 
is the general trust law regarding maintenance of the building 
held in trust as opposed to the concept of depreciation. Thus ex-
penses for "ordinary repairs" to the trust property are payable 
11 Matter of Edgar, 157 Misc. IO, 282 N.Y.S. 795 (1935); Matter of Adler, 164 Misc. 544, 
299 N.Y.S. 542 (1937); Matter of Horowitz, 192 Misc. 556, 80 N.Y.S. (2d) 286 (1944); Mat-
ter of Ottman's Estate, 197 Misc. 645, 95 N.Y.S. (2d) 5 (1949); In re Ball's Will, 197 Misc. 
1047, 96 N.Y.S. (2d) 201 (1950); In re Abeloff's Estate, 108 N.Y.S. (2d) 39 (1951); In re 
McCullough's Will, 154 N.Y.S. (2d) 517 (1956). Contra: Matter of Kaplan, 195 Misc. 132, 
88 N.Y.S. (2d) 851 (1949); In re Dahlmann's Estate, 95 N.Y.S. (2d) 74 (1949). These two 
cases decided by the late Surrogate McGarey of King's County held that it is the duty of 
a trustee to deduct a depreciation charge from income of improved real property unless 
the trust instrument or will has specifically directed otherwise. However, later New York 
decisions have refused to follow the rationale of the Kaplan case and still apply the general 
rule. The Kaplan decision evoked wide comment, mostly of an approving nature, among 
the law reviews, notably 63 HARv. L. REv. 180 (1949); 48 MICH L. REv. 542 (1950); 24 
N.Y. UNIV. L. REv. 1229 at 1234 (1949); I BUFF. L. REv. 156 (1951); 12 OHIO ST. L.J. 565 
(1951). 
12District of Columbia, Evans v. Ockershausen, 69 App. D.C. 285, 100 F. (2d) 695 
(1938), cert. den. 306 U.S. 633 (1939); Massachusetts, Nelligan v. Long, 320 Mass. 439, 70 
N.E. (2d) 175 (1946); Minnesota, In re Lee's Estate, 214 Minn. 448, 9 N.W. (2d) 245 (1943); 
New Jersey, Matter of Roth's Estate, 139 N.J. Eq. 588, 52 A. (2d) 811 (1947). There appears 
to be an exception to the general rule if the trust includes buildings that are being used 
in a going enterprise. Under such conditions depreciation of the buildings may be allowed. 
3 Scorr, TRUSTS, 2d ed., §239.4, p. 1873 (1956); 60 HARv. L. REv. 952 at 956 (1947); 38 
MINN. L. REv. 681 (1954), and cases collected therein. 
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out of income, whereas "permanent improvements" are payable 
out of the trust principal.13 However, "permanent improve-
ments" that will last for only a limited duration of time are pay-
able out of trust principal and their cost is to be amortized out of 
income for the expected life of the improvement.14 Theoretically, 
at least, it is apparent that this procedure would lead to a fair re-
sult, because if the beneficiary dies within a short period of time, 
he has not then paid for an inordinate share of the cost of the 
improvement, whereas if the beneficiary lives for a relatively long 
period of time, most of the benefits of the improvement have 
inured to him and not to the remainderman. It should be em-
phasized, however, that these rules are applicable to repairs and 
improvements, and do not apply to depreciation in the sense of 
general decay and obsolescence. 
When May the Trustee Set up a Depreciation Reserve? 
As pointed out above, the decisions tend to show that in the 
absence of a specific authorization or direction in the trust instru-
ment, the trustee is not under any duty to the remainderman to 
set aside a reserve for depreciation of buildings, and, in fact, owes 
a duty to the life tenant not to do so. Thus where the trustee has 
set aside out of income a reserve for depreciation of buildings, 
without any express authority in the trust instrument, the life 
beneficiary can compel the trustee to pay over the amount so set 
aside.15 If, on the other hand, there is a direction in the trust in-
strument to the trustee to set aside depreciation reserves out of 
income, then, of course, the trustee could properly do so and in 
all probability could be compelled to do so. The problem of the 
legality of such reserves thus arises when there is no explicit au-
thorization in the trust instrument, but the possibility of such 
authorization can be inferred from the language used. 
A New York surrogate's court16 has held that instructions in 
the trust instrument to pay out the "net rents, incomes, and 
profits" was insufficient evidence of an intent on the part of the 
settlor to authorize depreciation reserves. The Court of Appeals 
13 TRUSTS REsrATEMENT, §233 and comments thereto. 3 SCOTT, TRUSTS, 2d ed., §233.3, 
p. 1757 (1956). 
14 Ibid. 
15Estate of Edgar, 157 Misc. 10,282 N.Y.S. 795 (1935); Matter of Bohmert, 102 N.Y.S. 
(2d) 394 (1950); Matter of Roth's Estate, 139 N.J. Eq. 588, 52 A. (2d) 811 (1947). 
16 Estate of Edgar, 157 Misc. 10, 282 N .Y .S. 795 (1935). 
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for the Eighth Circuit1 7 held that a direction to the trustees to 
charge property income with "all necessary, proper and reasonable 
expenses of maintenance" was also insufficient evidence of such 
intent. 
In Laflin v. Commissioner,18 the Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit declared that language in a trust instrument granting 
general authority to trustee to pay "all costs of insurance and all 
necessary and proper costs, charges and expenses of any and every 
kind anq. description whatsoever connected with or growing out of 
the management of the trust estate ... " did not suggest any duty 
or right on the part of the trustee to set aside out of income reserves 
for depreciation. 
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit19 
recognized as appropriate the setting up of a depreciation reserve 
for a trust consisting of real property where the will authorized the 
trustee to determine whether receipts should be treated as capital 
or income and whether expenses should be charged to capital or 
income. It should be noted, however, that these federal cases are 
tax cases, and the rights and duties of the trustee are only second-
arily involved.20 
17 Hubbell v. Burnet, 46 F. (2d) 446 (1931). 
18 69 F. (2d) 460 (1934). 
19 Commissioner v. Saltonstall, 124 F. (2d) 110 (1941). 
20 The federal income tax laws do make allowance for the depredation of property 
held in a trust. "In the case of property held in a trust, the allowable [depredation] de-
duction shall be apportioned between the income beneficiaries and the trustee in accord-
ance with the pertinent provisions of the instrument creating the trust, or, in the absence 
of such provisions, on the basis of the trust income allocable to each." I.R.C., §167 (g). 
Treas. Reg. 1.167 (g) 1 (1956), '57 Fed. Tax Reports, Vol. 2, §1747, explains this pro-
vision in the following manner: "If property is held in trust, tpe allowable [depredation] 
deduction is to be apportioned between the income beneficiaries and the trustee on the 
basis of the trust income allocable to each, unless the governing instrument (or local 
law) requires or permits the trustee to maintain a reserve for depreciation in any amount. 
In the latter case, the deduction is first allocated to the trustee to the extent that income 
is set aside for a depreciation reserve, and any part of the deduction in excess of the in-
come set aside for the reserve shall be apportioned between the income beneficiaries and 
the trustee on the basis of the trust income (in excess of the income set aside for the re-
serve) allocable to each. For example: 
"(1) If under the trust instrument or local law the income of a trust computed with-
out regard to depreciation is to be distributed to a named beneficiary, the beneficiary is 
entitled to the deduction to the exclusion of the trustee. 
" (2) . If under the trust instrument or local law the income of a trust is to be dis-
tributed to a named beneficiary, but the trustee is directed to maintain a reserve for 
depredation in any amount, the deduction is allowed to the trustee (except to the extent 
that income set aside for the reserve is less than the allowable deduction). The same re-
sult would follow if the trustee sets aside income for a depredation reserve pursuant to 
discretionary authority to do so in the governing instrument. ' 
"No effect shall be given to any allocation of the depreciation deduction which gives 
any beneficiary or the trustee a share of such deduction greater than his pro rata share 
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Conclusion 
If we follow the proposition that the testator's intent should 
govern in the construction of the instrument, we are not aided to 
any great extent in the usual situation. In all probability the tes-
tator has not thought about the problem of depreciation reserves, 
and hence the use of the standard phrase "pay over the net income" 
may be ambiguous in that it does not tell us whether the testator 
authorized the setting up of reserves for depreciation or not. Per-
haps one might infer such authorization from the testator's past 
conduct. Did he himself make allowances for depreciation in han-
dling this particular property? Generally, the writers who have 
considered the problem have advocated the allocation of deprecia-
tion reserves in the administration of trusts of improved realty.21 
Professor Scott is of the opinion that trustees holding rented real 
property should be allowed to set up depreciation reserves, unless 
the buildings produce so little income that were such a reserve 
withheld there would be either no net income or an income substan-
tially lower than the ordinary return as trust investments.22 Since 
the courts have been slow in adopting such suggestions, perhaps 
the answer would lie in statutory authorization of depreciation 
reserves. Florida has done so.23 The only other available proce-
dure thus appears to lie with the attorney in drafting the particular 
trust instrument. The draftsman should discuss the question with 
the client, and if the client so desires, a provision authorizing de-
preciation reserves should be placed in the trust instrument itself. 
Ross Kipka, S.Ed. 
of the trust income, irrespective of any provisions in the trust instrument, except as other-
wise provided in this paragraph when the trust instrument or local law requires or per-
mits the trustee to maintain a reserve for depreciation." 
21 63 HARV. L. R.Ev. 180 (1949); 48 MICH. L. REv. 542 (1950); 24 N.Y. UNIV. L. R.Ev. 
1229 at 1234 (1949); l BUFF. L. R.Ev. 156 (1951); 12 OHIO ST. L.J. 565 (1951). 
22 3 Scorr, TRUSTS, 2d ed., §239.4, p. 1874 (1956). 
23 Fla. Stat. (1944) §691.03 (14). "In the absence of contrary or limiting provisions in 
the trust instrument or a subsequent order or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction, 
the trustee of an express trust is authorized. • • • (14) to create reserves out of income for 
depreciation, obsolescence, amortization or to insure prompt payment of taxes or assess-
ments, general or special and other obligations, and to restore to income such reserves 
as may be unused." 
